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I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment of employees by their fellow employees and su-
pervisors is one of the most publicized and discussed topics in the
United States.' This is particularly true in the wake of the Clarence
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1. The amount of scholarly research in the past five years on the topic of sexual
harassment is voluminous. See generally Todd B. Adams, Universalism and Sexual
Harassment, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 683 (1991); Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Le-
gal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAm L. REv. 773 (1993); Dawn D. Bennett-Alexander, Hos-
Thomas Supreme Court confirmation hearings which succeeded in pro-
pelling this issue into the nation's consciousness.2 Sexual harassment is
tile Environment Sexual Harassment: A Clearer View, 42 LAB. L.J. 131 (1991); Eileen
M. Blackwood, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law and the Case for
Subjectivity, 16 VT. L. REV. 1005 (1992); Cynthia G. Bowman, Street Harassment and
the Iqformal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARv. L. REV. 517 (1993); Maria M.
Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VII:
Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 41 (1992-93); Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the
Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988); Dana S. Connell,
Effective Sexual Harassment Policies: Unexpected Lessons from Jacksonville Ship-
yards, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 191 (1991); Stacy J. Cooper, Sexual Harassment and.
the Swedish Bikini Team: A Reevaluation of the "Hostile Environment" Doctrine, 26
COLUM. J.L & Soc. PROBS. 387 (1993); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE
L.J. 1177 (1990); David S. Hames, An Actionable Condition of Work-Related Sexual
Harassment, 43 LAB. L.J. 430 (1992); Rachael A. Hetherington & Barbara C. Wallace,
Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 Miss. C. L. REV. 37 (1992); Ken
Jennings & Melissa Clapp, A Managerial Tightrope: Balancing Harassed and Harass-
ing Employees' Rights in Sexual Discrimination Cases, 40 LAB. L.J. 756 (1989); Wil-
liam L. Kandel, Mixed Motives, Sexual Harassment and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
17 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 635 (1992); David A. Larson, What Can You Say, Where Can
You Say It, and To Whom? A Guide to Understanding and Preventing Unlawful
Sexual Harassment, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 827 (1992); Anne C. Levy, The Change in
Employer Liability for Supervisor Sexual Harassment After Meritor: Much Ado About
Nothing, 42 ARK. L. REV. 795 (1989); Thomas J. Piskorski, Reinstatement of the Sexu-
al Harasser: The Conflict Between Federal Labor Law and Title VII, 18 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 617 (1993); Lisa A. Blanchard, Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
Employer Liability for a Sexually Hostile Environment, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 91 (1988);
Deborah S. Brenneman, Comment, From a Woman's Point of View: The Use of the
Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. CIN. L REV. 1281
(1992); Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law?
A Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42
DUKE L.J. 854 (1993); Penny L. Cigoy, Comment, Harmless Amusement of Sexual
Harassment?: The Reasonableness of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 20 PEPP. L.
REV. 1071 (1993); Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The "Unwelcome" Re-
quirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558 (1992); Tina
Kirstein-Ezzell, Note, Eradicating Title VII Sexual Harassment by Recognizing an
Employer's Duty to Prohibit Sexual Harassment, 33 ARiz. L. REV. 383 (1991); P.J.
Murray, Comment, Employer: Beware of "Hostile Environment" Sexual Harassment,
26 DuQ. L. REV. 461 (1989); Joshua F. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment and
the Hostile Work Environment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1361; Bonnie B. Westman, Note, The
Reasonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 18
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 795 (1992); Note, Pornography, Equality, and a Discrimina-
tion-Free Workplace: A Comparative Perspective, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1993).
2. The Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmation hearings generated an in-
tense amount of press coverage and commentary. See generally Marlene Cimons, The
Click! Heard 'Round the Nation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at El; Derrick Z. Jackson,
After the Thomas Affair, Progress-or Silence? BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1991, at A37;
Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Wages of Cynicism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at
A31; The Thomas Nomination: Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas
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also extensively litigated and is becoming an ever-increasing concern to
business managers fearful of its financial consequences and embarrass-
ing publicity.' Conversely, one aspect of sexual harassment which has
received very little attention occurs when the harasser is not a fellow
employee or supervisor but is instead a non-employee such as a cus-
tomer, supplier or client.
4
According to a Wall Street Journal article, observers of this kind of
sexual harassment claim that "such third party harassment is ram-
pant."5 Unfortunately for the victims, almost always women, the harass-
ment is seldom reported.' Many women, constrained by the economic
pressures of sustaining an ongoing relationship with a client, customer,
or supplier, simply endure it.7 Other victims are reluctant to report the
harassment for fear of being perceived as unable to cope in the
workplace!
This brand of sexual harassment is not only common, but the impact
it has on its victims may be even greater than fellow employee sexual
harassment. This is due to the fact that much of it occurs outside the
traditional office or factory where it is not as visible and, therefore, less
easily prevented.' Consequently, female professionals and sales repre-
sentatives, who often must meet on their customers' premises or in
restaurants and drinking establishments to conduct business, are vul-
nerable targets."
Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at A12; James Warren, Coverage Offers Class
on Sexual Harassment, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 1991, at Ci.
3. The fear is probably justified. One article estimates that from 42% to 90% of
women in the workplace have been victims of sexual harassment. See David E.
Terpstra & Douglas A. Baker, A Hierarchy of Sexual Harassment, 121 J. PSYCHOL.
599 (1987). But see The Roper Org. Inc., Most Americans Say.Sexual Harassment At
Work Not a Problem, Roper Reps. No. 92-1 (1992) (analyzing a poll that contradicts
the perception that sexual harassment in the workplace is widespread).
4. See Joseph G. Allegretti, Sexual Harassment by Nonemployees: The Limits of
Employer Liability, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 98 (1983) (discussing non-employee sexual
harassment in view of specific and analogous case law and commentary).
5. L.A. Winokur, Harassment of Workers by 'Third Parties' Can Lead Into Maze
of Legal, Moral Issues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1992, at BI.
6. Id.
.7. Id.
8. Id. (discussing a Pulitzer prize winning journalist who refused to report inci-
dents of harassment for fear of being labeled "a woman who can't hold her own").
9. Id.
10. Id.
Indeed, sexual harassment in any setting continues to be poorly un-
derstood. Men, almost always the harassers, may not necessarily intend
to offend." Often their concept of harassment is narrower than a
woman's." This discrepancy in perception is likely to be even greater
when the harasser is a customer, client, or supplier. Such parties might
avail themselves of such a situation because they perceive that the
victim is "working for them." Therefore, the third parties feel they can
impose themselves on the employee due to their relatively powerful
position. 3 Others may feel that because the victim is fortunate enough
to have the harasser's business, she is obligated to tolerate his manner
of handling relationships.'4
Employers are also unprepared to deal with harassment by non-em-
ployees. They do not want to rile a valued business customer, client, or
supplier. In addition, in many cases, the employer is not physically
present or is unable to control the conduct of non-employees. In some
situations, employers find it more expedient to alter the employee's
duties or even fire the victimized employee.'" A case in point is an em-
ployee of a New York advertising agency. She was terminated after
repeated complaints about being harassed by a senior vice president of
TWA, an influential client." She subsequently filed suit against her for-
mer employer, TWA, and the TWA employee.'"
Presently, there are few reported cases involving sexual harassment
by non-employees.'" This is likely to change, however, as victimized
11. See, e.g., Adler & Peirce, supra note 1, at 803-04 (citing commentaries and
research to illustrate the contentiousness of the issue of whether men intend to sexu-
ally harass women in the workplace). See also Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment:
The Inside Story, WORKING WOMAN, June 1992, at 47 (quoting a woman who express-
es the view that sexual harassers are seeking to victimize women and exert power).
But see Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing how men
do not always view their conduct the same way as women and often do not intend
or consider their conduct to be sexual harassment).
12. Adler & Peirce, supra note 1, at 811. Adler and Peirce maintain that sexual ha-
rassment consists of not only conduct which both the reasonable woman and men
view as sexual harassment, but also certain conduct that the reasonable woman, but
not men, would consider harassment. Id. The authors contend that, although there
are other points of view, this model reflects the current research and commentary on
the issue. Id.
13. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1
(1979) (arguing that sexual harassment is created when a relationship of unequal
power occurs in the workplace).
14. Winokur, supra note 5, at B1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. ("When I was dismissed, the agency told me, in so many words, that it
was either me or the account.").
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., No. 91-359 (D. Nev. filed May 14,
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employees become increasingly aware of the conduct's illegality and are
no longer fearful of reprisal or being perceived as weak.'
The purpose of this article is to discuss the relevant law regarding
sexual harassment by third parties. The article will also examine how
courts in the future might judge what is sexual harassment, taking into
account the type of job involved as well as the particular harassment
alleged. Lastly, a policy will be proposed for preventing and handling
this type of employee sexual harassment.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY NON-EMPLOYEES: THE RELEVANT LAW
A. Provocative Dress Cases
One form of sexual harassment committed by non-employees, which
has been the subject of litigation and, indeed, constitutes analogous
legal precedent to the kind described above, is that involving provoca-
tive dress codes imposed only on female employees. The first such case
to address the issue was EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp.2 In this case, the
victim was compelled to wear a short, poncho-like uniform that ex-
posed her thighs and portions of her buttocks.' She was subsequently
propositioned sexually and was the target of obscene comments and
gestures.' After she refused to wear the uniform, she was dis-
charged.u The district court ruled that the employer violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' by requiring the employee to wear a
sexually provocative uniform as a condition of employment." The
court added that it was foreseeable that requiring the employee to wear
1991) (plaintiff prevailed in a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether
an employer could be liable for the sexual harassment of an employee by a custom-
er). In a subsequent trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant. See
Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., No. 91-359 (D. Nev. filed Jan. 8, 1993).
20. Winokur, supra note 5, at B1.
21. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
22. Id. at 604.
23. Id. at 605.
24. Id. at 606.
25. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp.
II 1990) [hereinafter Title VII] prohibits employment discrimination and will be dis-
cussed below in greater detail.
26. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 611.
the uniform would result in the employee being sexually harassed by
customers.27
Shortly after the Sage Realty decision, a federal district court in
Marentette v. Michigan Host, Inc.' concurred in dicta with the Sage
Realty court's holding. The Marentette court similarly asserted that an
employer who exposes an employee to sexual harassment because of
its requirement that she wear sexually alluring dress violates Title VII.'
Several years later, in EEOC v. Newtown Inn Ass'n,' the plaintiffs,
all female cocktail waitresses, were likewise required to comply with
their employer's marketing scheme, which was intended "to project an
air of sexual availability to customers through the use of provocative
outfits."31 This included revealing dress for thematic events such as
"Bikini Night," "P.J. Night," and "Whips and Chains Night." ' The plain-
tiffs contended that as a result of this required attire, they became "sub-
jected to unwelcome sexual proposals and both verbal and physical
abuse of a sexual nature. "' In a subsequent administrative hearing,
which was upheld by the district court, the EEOC determined that the
plaintiffs were reassigned to less desirable shifts in retaliation for their
complaints.'
Finally, in Priest v. Rotary,' a district court ruled that the plaintiff
had established a prima facie case when she proved that she was dis-
missed from her job as a cocktail lounge waitress for refusing to wear a
sexually suggestive dress after having been sexually harassed.' The
court explained that requiring such attire violated Title VII if it was a
condition of employment.37
One common thread that often runs through these cases is the
employer's defense that he has the right to impose a grooming and
dress code.' This argument has been generally rejected by the courts.
27. Id. at 608.
28. 506 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
29. Id. at 912.
30. 647 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Va. 1986).
31. Id. at 958.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 958-59.
35. 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
36. Id. at 581.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 608-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
("The prerogative to impose reasonable grooming and dress requirements ... does
not mean that an 'employer has the unfettered discretion ... to require its employ-
ees to wear any uniform the employer chooses, including uniforms which may be
characterized as revealing and sexually provocative.'") (quoting EEOC v. Sage Realty
Corp., 87 F.R.D. 365, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
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In Title VII cases in general, the courts have found that the imposition
of certain dress policies on one sex only violates that Act's provisions if
the additional requirement involves "immutable characteristics; charac-
teristics which consist of fundamental rights, even if they are not inmnu-
table (i.e., having children or marrying); and characteristics which, al-
though not immutable, significantly affect the employment opportunities
or the terms and conditions of employment afforded one sex."' Clear-
ly, the last scenario applies to Sage Realty and its progeny.'
B. Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment by Non-Employees in
General
The cases discussed above demonstrate that employers can be held
liable for sexual harassment by non-employees. In these cases, the em-
ployers not only allowed the harassment to occur but, in most circum-
stances, encouraged the sexual harassment by requiring their female
employees to wear provocative attire.4' Their actions, in turn, signifi-
cantly affected the plaintiffs' terms and conditions of employment."
Moreover, the employers only imposed the sexually provocative dress
requirements on their female employees.'
Such cases are factually distinguishable from other types of sexual
harassment by non-employees, including those where the victims are
sales representatives or other similar professionals. In those situations,
the victim's dress is not imposed by the employer and is not meant to
provoke a sexual response. Thus, the foregoing line of cases is distin-
guishable because it does not fully probe the legal or ethical parameters
of the issue. In the following discussion, the relevant law concerning
this issue will be reviewed, including provisions of Title VII, EEOC
Guidelines, and applicable case law. It will then be demonstrated that
although there is presently no published case law directly on point,'
39. BARBARA L SCHLEi & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 412 (2d
ed. 1983).
40. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 604.
42. See, e.g., id. at 605.
43. See generally supra notes 21-37. In these cases, all the plaintiffs were female
employees and no comparable revealing attire was ever required of male employees.
44. See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., No. 91-359 (D. Nev. filed May 14, 1991).
The court wrote, "Because 'Title VII affords employees the right to work in an envi-
ronment free of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' this court holds that,
in the appropriate case, an employer could be liable for the sexual harassment of
there is enough analogous law and dicta to indicate how the courts will
resolve this issue when it is raised-and it will be raised.
C. Title VII and Sexual Harassment by Non-Employees
The legal source of employers' liability for sexual harassment is Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Title VII provides that it is an "un-
lawful employment practice for an employer... to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'
Considering the literal meaning of the statutory language of Title VII,
it would be difficult to argue that liability can be imposed on an em-
ployer for non-employee sexual harassment.47 The most obvious obsta-
cle is that Title V's usage of the word "employer" indicates that the
employer actually must be the party committing the harassment.' Al-
though it is well settled that employers can .be liable for the sexual ha-
rassment of their employees by the employees' supervisors and fellow
employees,49 it can be argued that the necessary control an employer
exercises over these parties is absent when compared to non-employ-
ees.' As will be discussed later, the EEOC and the courts, including
the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,5 have im-
posed, under Title VII, a duty on employers to maintain a workplace
that is free of sexual harassment.' By implication, this will almost cer-
tainly include harassment by non-employees.
Title VII also provides that an employer violates the statute when an
employer or supervisor demands sexual consideration from an employ-
ee in exchange for job benefits. Such instances of sexual harassment
employees by nonemployees, including its customers." Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
46. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
47. Allegretti, supra note 4, at 100-04.
48. Id. at 100.
49. In Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court appar-
ently approved of holding an employer liable for sexual harassment committed by su-
pervisors. Id. at 70. The Court held that "where a supervisor exercises the authority
actually delegated to him by his employer, by making or threatening to make deci-
sions affecting the employment status of his subordinates, such actions are properly
imputed to the employer whose delegation of authority empowered the supervisor to
undertake them." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 65 ("Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.").
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have become known as "quid pro quo" cases.' To recover damages,
the victim must suffer a real economic loss. A common example of this
kind of case is where an employee is fired for refusing to submit to the
sexual overtures made by her supervisor.'
Another theory of sexual harassment has developed under Title VII as
a result of the Meritor case.' Under the "hostile environment" line of
cases, actionable sex discrimination occurs when the terms and condi-
tions of the employee's work environment become altered due to the
severe and pervasive nature of sexual harassment.' In these cases, an
employee does not have to suffer an actual economic loss but is ha-
rassed by sexual innuendo, fondling, and other such conduct which she
has not welcomed and which detrimentally alters her work environ-
ment. 7
Although the Sage Realty case, discussed earlier, was decided five
years before Meritor, it is interesting to speculate as to whether it
could have been decided on the hostile environment theory. For exam-
ple, in Priest v. Rotary,' decided only four months before Meritor, the
court cited Henson v. City of Dundee' for the elements of a prima
facie hostile environment case.' Henson, as discussed below, subse-
quently influenced the Supreme Court's decision in the landmark
53. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(2) (1992) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines] (defining quid pro quo sexual
harassment).
54. See generally Adler & Peirce, supra note 1, at 770-80 '(discussing quid pro quo
sexual harassment).
55. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment.'") (alteration in original) (quoting Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (lth Cir. 1982)).
56. See generally Adler & Peirce, supra note 1, at 778-79; see also EEOC Guide-
lines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (defining hostile environment sexual harassment).
57. Adler & Peirce, supra note 1, at 793; see also Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, N-915-050
(BNA) 89, 102 (March 1, 1990).
58. In Sage Realty, the court ruled that an employer violated Title VII by requiring,
as a condition of employment and on the basis of an employee's sex, that an em-
ployee wear sexually provocative attire which knowingly resulted in sexual harass-
ment. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
59. 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
60. 682 F.2d 897 (lth Cir. 1982).
61. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
Meritor case.' The Priest case also involved the sexual harassment of
a female employee by customers caused by the provocative dress that
her employer forced her to wear.'
This strongly suggests that other sexual harassment by non-employee
cases could advance similarly under the hostile environment theory. For
example, if a female sales representative were subjected to highly ob-
jectionable sexual conduct in a pervasive and severe manner by one of
her customers, this would significantly alter the terms and conditions of
her work. As a result, she might be reluctant to approach her harassing
customer, who she now finds reprehensible. This would create a hostile
environment case because her customer's place of business is a pait of
her workplace. Moreover, if she were to react by ceasing any dealings
with the customer, she would lose a valuable account which would af-
fect her income and advancement.
Indeed, if this happens and the employee is subsequently demoted or
fired by an employer who knows or should know about the harassment,
the employee, like the plaintiff in Sage Realty,' may be able to prove
discrimination and consequent economic loss. In addition, if the
employer's actions can be characterized as intentional discrimination on
the basis of the salesperson's gender, the employer may be liable not
only for economic loss but also compensatory and punitive damages
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 if the behavior could be character-
ized as malicious or reckless.'
Although courts may interpret Title VII to include incidents of sexual
harassment by non-employees, the fact remains that the relevant lan-
guage of the Act does not specifically prohibit non-employee sexual ha-
rassment. The following sources of legal authority, although not legally
binding, expressly address this issue.
D. EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment by Non-Employees
EEOC Guidelines indicate the path that courts will likely take on the
issue. The EEOC Guidelines, promulgated in 1980, provide the follow-
ing:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with re-
spect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer
62. See infra notes 109-120 and accompanying text.
63. Priest, 634 F. Supp. at 581.
64. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 613 (ruling that because the plaintiff was wrong-
fully discharged, she was entitled to back pay, pension contributions, and the benefits
she would have received had she not been fired).
65. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1992). Under the 1991 Act, damag-
es will be capped based on the number of employees working for the defendant. Id.
§ 1981b(3).
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(or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the
conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In re-
viewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the employer's
control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with re-
spect to the conduct of such non-employees.'
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has afforded considerable
weight to the foregoing EEOC Guidelines. In General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, the Court stated that any rulings, interpretations, and opinions
by the EEOC under Title VII constitute a "body of experience and in-
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance." 7 However, the Court stopped short of asserting that the fore-
going EEOC pronouncements would be controlling in such cases. Later,
in the landmark case of Meritor, the Court cited the same guidelines for
scrutinizing hostile environment cases of sexual harassment in the
workplace.'
The EEOC Guidelines clarify the issue in several ways. First, they pro-
vide that employers can be liable for sexual harassment by non-employ-
ees. This expands the language of Title VII, which appears to support an
action based solely on employer sexual harassment. Secondly, the Guide-
lines refer to "acts" of non-employees. This may apply to acts which
result in an economic loss, such as in quid pro quo cases, as well as acts
which create a hostile environment. Finally, the Guidelines explicitly
state that an employer can be liable if he "knows or should have known
of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective ac-
tion."' However, with employees such as sales representatives and oth-
er professionals, the EEOC will probably consider the ability of the em-
ployer to respond and the amount of control the employer can assert
over the employee. This results from the constraints placed on the em-
ployer in gaining knowledge of the harassment due to less structure and
supervision over the employee's activities.
E. Court Cases and Dicta
In addition to the EEOC Guidelines, at least three federal circuit courts
and one district court have stated in dicta that employees can be sexual-
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1992) (emphasis added).
67. 429 U.S. 125, 14142 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
68. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
69. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1992).
ly harassed by non-employees. In Whitaker v. Carney,' a former city
employee attempted to enforce a request for access to sexual harassment
claims filed against him by female employees of the city.7 The Fifth Cir-
cuit indicated in dicta that an employer has a duty to take actions
against non-employees for sexual harassment of his or her employees.'
Similarly, in Garziano v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,' the Fifth
Circuit again implied that sexual harassment by non-employees is action-
able, citing the specific EEOC Guidelines presented above when discuss-
ing the duties that an employer owes his employees in protecting them
from sexual harassment.74
In the now famous case of Henson v. City of Dundee,7 which in-
volved the hostile environment sexual harassment of employees by fel-
low employees, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that a supervisor, a
co-worker, or "even strangers to the workplace" can cause sexual harass-
ment.6
Lastly, in Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 77 in which a subordinate al-
legedly sexually harassed a superior, a district court made it clear that
any number of parties can be held liable for sexual harassment. The
court again noted, "[T]he environment in which an employee works can
be rendered offensive in equal degrees by the acts of supervisors,
co-workers, or even strangers to the workplace." '
F. Possible Defenses: Reasonable Dress Code Standards and BFOQ
Employers may be able to assert possible defenses in cases involving
the imposition of certain sexually provocative dress. As discussed, em-
ployers can, in general, require their employees to adhere to reasonable
grooming and dress code standards.79 However, if grooming standards
70. 778 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1985).
71. Id. at 221.
72. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)).
73. 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987).
74. Id. at 387 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)).
75. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 910 (quoting EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609-10, 601
n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)).
77. 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
78. Id. at 272 (emphasis added) (citing EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp.
599, 609-10, 610 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 68 (4th Cir.
1978); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(e)).
79. See generally Allegretti, supra note 4; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39;
Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977); Peter F. Ziegler, Note, Employer Dress
and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L.
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or dress codes disparately impact one sex and detrimentally affect the
ability of employees of that sex to perform their jobs, they become un-
reasonable and actionable under Title VII.' Accordingly, in Carroll v.
Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,8 the Seventh Circuit ruled that
an employer violated the Act by requiring female employees to wear
uniforms, while permitting men to wear business suits.' In another
case, Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,' a district court found that the
defendant's policy of forcing female employees to wear contact lenses
but allowing its male employees to wear either glasses or contact lenses
similarly violated the Act.u The court maintained that the distinction in
the policy sustained the stereotype of women as sex objects.' In light
of these cases, it is not surprising that sexually provocative dress re-
quired of only female employees could not survive as a defense in apply-
ing the Sage Realty line of cases discussed previously.'
There may, however, be a bona fide occupation qualification (BFOQ)
defense available in narrow instances involving sexually provocative
dress. According to the Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson,87 the
BFOQ defense is intended to be narrowly applied.' In Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways,' the Fifth Circuit stated that a BFOQ can
only be utilized "when the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively."' Hence, in
Diaz, the court refused to accept the argument that hiring males as flight
attendants would undermine the essence of travel on the defendant's air-
line."
Despite the narrowness of the defense, it remains unresolved whether
an employer may impose on female employees a provocative and sexy
REV. 965 (1973).
80. See, e.g., SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 415.
81. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
82. Id. at 1033 ("(W]hen some employees are uniformed and others not there is a
natural tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a lesser professional
status than their male colleagues attired in normal business clothes.").
83. 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated and remanded in part and affd in
part, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
84. Id. at 790.
85. See id.
86. See supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
87. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
88. Id. at 334.
89. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
90. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 388-89.
attire for a job in which "sex appeal" constitutes the "essence of the
business operation." There is support for the proposition that this can
occur in isolated instances. For example, the authors of an informal
EEOC publication' state that "jobs may be restricted to members of
one sex... in jobs in the entertainment industry for which sex appeal is
an essential qualification."' According to at least one commentator, this
includes topless and striptease dancers.' However, it would be more
difficult to justify the requirement that cocktail waitresses in some estab-
lishments must wear sexually enticing attire. In these cases, it becomes
necessary to determine whether the primary function or essence of the
business is one of serving drinks and entertainment or one of sex ap-
peal.'5 In at least one case, Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York State
Division of Human Rights,6 a state court ruled that a restaurant could
not discriminate against its waiters, who were fired and replaced by
scantily dressed waitresses, by advancing a BFOQ based on sex ap-
peal.7 However, in St. Cross v. Playboy Club,' an appeal board ruled
that employment as a "bunny" did give rise to a successful BFOQ de-
fense.
The BFOQ defense, although possibly effective in limited situations,
will have little impact on sexual harassment cases by non-employees in
general. As stated, the provocative dress cases likely represent only a
portion of the instances in which the harassment occurs. Obviously, it
does not apply to many other conditions of employment that were dis-
cussed earlier. However, even in circumstances where female employees
work in establishments which rely primarily on the business of "sex
appeal," an employer is liable if an employee is sexually harassed. In-
92. Sirota, supra note 79, at 1066 (discussing EEOC publication entitled TOWARD
JOB EQUALITY FOR WOMEN (1969)). Because the ten page booklet was apparently writ-
ten for informal use by the general public, it should not be considered a legitimate
medium for declaring a new BFOQ category. See id. at 1060 n.213.
93. Id. at 1066.
94. Id.
95. Id. This issue was being litigated in Las Vegas, as of September, 1993, in a
suit against the Rio Suite Hotel and Casino. The "Ipanema Girls," dressed in three-
inch high heels and costumes that expose virtually all of their buttocks, filed sexual
harassment claims with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission, arguing that the attire
caused them to be objects of ridicule and sexual comments. Their attorney claims
that the requirement that females only wear the costume is actionable by itself. Since
the Rio Suite Hotel is primarily a casino, it likely cannot sustain an argument that its
primary function is sex appeal. See John L. Smith, Tradition, Changing Times Col-
lide in Sex Harassment Case, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, July 29, 1993, at B1.
96. 360 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), appeal dismissed, 369 N.Y.S.2d 1027
(N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
97. Id. at 938.
98. Appeal No. 773, State Human Rights Appeal Board (N.Y. 1971). See Sirota,
supra note 79, at 1067-68.
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deed, a striptease dancer can be sexually harassed by a customer. A
discussion of a policy to contain sexual harassment by non-employees
follows.
III. STANDARDS FOR JUDGING SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY NON-EMPLOYEES:
EMPLOYEE ANALOGY
Apart from the Sage Realty line of cases and some instances described
in the popular press,' the authors are unaware of any reported cases in
which a court has ruled on the issue of sexual harassment of employees
by non-employees. Consequently, well-established standards for judging
what sexual harassment by non-employees might encompass do not ex-
ist. However, a great number of cases and commentaries have focused
on how to assess sexual harassment by supervisors and fellow employ-
ees. In the following discussion, the authors, will briefly discuss how the
various circuits view sexual harassment. The focus will be on the
so-called "hostile environment" type of sexual harassment,"° as opposed
to the "quid pro quo" type.'°' The reason for this emphasis is that hos-
tile environment cases are more difficult to define. 2 The judgment re-
quired in determining whether sexual harassment and its resultant legal
problems exist are not present. Moreover, the authors believe that the
predominate cases that will arise in the future regarding non-employee
sexual harassment will be based on a hostile environment scenario.
A. Hostile Environment and Sexual Harassment
Hostile environment sexual harassment cases have their jurisprudential
roots in the case of Rogers v. EEOC. Rogers involved a Hispanic em-
ployee who was subjected to ethnic slurs.'" The Fifth Circuit held that
99. See generally Smith, supra note 95; Winokur, supra note 5; see also Powell v.
Las Vegas Hilton, No. 91-359 (D. Nev. filed May 14, 1991).
100. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text; infra notes 103-125 and accom-
panying text.
101. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
102. See generally Adler & Peirce, supra note 1, at 798-818 (discussing the evolu-
tion of hostile environment cases and the legal and ethical problems with defining a
hostile environment).
103. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
104. Id. at 235.
Title VII covers not only economic harm but psychological harm as well
if it interferes with job performance.
In 1980, the EEOC issued its Guidelines on sexual harassment"
which were followed by several circuit courts. The District of Columbia
Circuit ruled, in Bundy v. Jackson,'7 that a Title VII harassment analy-
sis based on race, religion, or ethnicity also applies to harassment based
on sex, even if the victim did not lose any tangible job benefits."
A year later, the Eleventh Circuit, in Henson v. City of Dundee," ex-
panded the hostile environment concept. Restating the Bundy reasoning,
the court set forth five elements for proving a hostile environment: (1)
the employee must belong to a protected class; (2) the employee must be
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, including sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature; (3) the harassment complained of must be based on gender;
(4) the harassment complained of must affect a "term, condition or privi-
lege" of employment; and (5) the employer must be liable under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior."'
Under the Henson approach, the victim must not solicit or incite the
conduct, and the defendant's conduct must be "undesirable and offen-
sive.""' The court also stated that gender-based harassment must be
"sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive working environment.""'2
The hostile environment claim of the type involved in Bundy"' and
Henson.4 was ultimately sanctioned as the law of the land in the land-
mark Supreme Court case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson."5 Even
in the wake of Meritor, however, the circuit courts continue to interpret
"hostile environment" in myriad ways. Some circuits, including the First
Circuit," ' the Second Circuit,"' the Fourth Circuit, ' the Fifth Cir-
105. Id. at 238.
106. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1992).
107. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
108. Id. at 943-44.
109. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
110. Id. at 903-04.
111. Id. at 903.
112. Id. at 904.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
114. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
115. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
116. Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
117. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
118. Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 21: 447, 1994] Sexual Harassment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
cuit,"9 the Sixth Circuit,'20 the Seventh Circuit,12"' the Tenth Cir-
cuit,' the Eleventh Circuit,"n and the District of Columbia ircuit1
2
have adopted the Henson elements.
However, not all circuits have followed the Henson approach. For
example, in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia," the Third Circuit de-
parted from Henson by not requiring proof of unwelcomeness by the
victim. Rather, the court focused on the objective and subjective effect
the harassing conduct had on the plaintiff.'
21
B. Reasonable Woman Standard
Another departure from Henson involves the so-called "reasonable
woman" standard. This standard, which was first introduced in a com-
mentary, 27 was judicially recognized in a famous dissent." The EEOC
later embraced the "reasonable woman" standard.'" The concept of a
reasonable woman standard, however, was not widely accepted until the
Ninth Circuit case of Ellison v. Brady." In that 1991 case, the court
119. Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989).
120. Dabish v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 902 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1990).
121. Trautwetter v. Quitch, 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1990).
122. See, e.g., Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir.
1990) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
123. Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 1988).
124. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
125. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
126. Id. at 1483-84 (ruling that the subjective viewpoint demonstrates that the pur-
ported conduct injured the specific victim while the objective standard protects the
defendant from the hyper-sensitive plaintiff).
127. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title
VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1984) (arguing that the reasonable woman standard
protects women from hostile and offensive behavior).
128. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the reasonable victim standard "simultaneously allows courts to
consider salient sociological differences as well as shield employers from the neurotic
complainant"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
129. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Current Issues
of Sexual Harassment, N-915-050 (BNA) 89 (March 1, 1990) ("In determining whether
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile environment, the
harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective standpoint of a 'reasonable
person.'" The Guidelines further state that the objective standard should take into
account "the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behav-
ior.").
130. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637
held that a plaintiff was required to prove "conduct which a reasonable
woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the con-
ditions of employment and create an abusive working environment."3
The Eighth Circuit recently approved of this standard in Burns v.
Macgregor Electronic Industries."
C. Sexual Harassment by Non-Employees: Applying the
Ellison Approach
The federal circuits have adopted various approaches to determine
whether a plaintiff has proven "unwelcomeness" under Henson." The
circuits have addressed whether a plaintiff has proven that a "reasonable
person""u or "reasonable woman"" would find that conduct detrimen-
tally altered the conditions of employment. In addition, it is necessary to
establish a standard for judging the act or acts in non-employment ha-
rassment cases. The Ellison court's standard for determining sexual ha-
rassment is particularly useful and may offer an effective means of
judging sexual harassment by non-employees. To prove a prima facie
hostile environment case under Ellison, the plaintiff must show "conduct
which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work-
ing environment."" Thus, under Ellison, a showing of "unwelcomeness"
is not required to prove that the plaintiff has been sexually harassed.'37
However, despite the difference between the Henson court's
"unwelcomeness" approach and the Ellison court's "reasonable woman"
approach, the outcome under both approaches will be virtually the same.
After all, a workplace that is "abusive" would certainly be "unwelcome."
The approach taken by the Ellison court has a number of positive as-
pects. First, the Ellison court adopted a reasonable woman standard in
judging sexual harassment." The court argued that this standard is
(6th Cir. 1987); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523
(M.D. Fla 1991).
131. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
132. 989 F.2d 959, 962 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) ("We note and agree with commentary
that suggests, in hostile environment litigation under Title VII, the appropriate stan-
dard is that of a reasonable woman under similar circumstances.").
133. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
134. See, e.g., Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 580 (10th
Cir. 1990); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir. 1990);
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
135. EUison, 924 F.2d at 879; Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir.
1987); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
136. EUison, 924 F.2d at 879.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 878 ("We therefore prefer to analyze harassment from the victim's per-
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preferable to the reasonable person standard used in several other cir-
cuits'" because the reasonable person standard tends to reinforce "ste-
reotyped notions of acceptable behavior."40 Thus, the reasonable per-
son standard, the court explained, would allow harassers to continue to
harass "merely because a particular discriminatory practice was com-
mon, and victims of harassment would have no remedy."'
The court reasoned that the reasonable person standard caters to a
male bias, thus overlooking the experiences of women. 42 Under a rea-
sonable person standard, which is said to be dominated by how males
view various acts with a sexual content, men could perceive certain acts
as relatively harmless.4 1 Women, however, could view the same situa-
tion as offensive.'" The court believed that women's historic subjection
to sexual assault explains the perception differential:
[Blecause women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, wom-
en have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who
are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry wheth-
er a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who
are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without
a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a
woman may perceive."'
Second, the Ellison court requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that
the sexually harassing conduct be "sufficiently severe and pervasive to
alter the conditions of... employment and create an abusive work envi-
ronment."46 However, the severity of the conduct shall be considered to
"var[y] inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct."'47
Thus, one act may be sufficient if it is particularly severe, while less
objectionable incidents may be sufficient if they occur frequently. This
requirement is beneficial because it would excuse one isolated act unless
it was highly repugnant. At the same time, a series of small but festering
incidents of sexual harassment do not go unpunished under this analysis.
spective.").
139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
140. EUison, 924 F.2d at 878.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 879.
143. Id. at 878.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
In addition, this analysis examines the incidents from the perspective of
a reasonable woman.
The reasonable woman standard, therefore, accounts for the reactions
of a hyper-sensitive victim. Because a reasonable woman in the victim's
place could have had a similar reaction, the Ellison court did not view
the victim's reaction as either "hyper-sensitive" or "idiosyncratic."148
One last aspect of Ellison merits discussion. The court asserted that a
harasser can be liable even if he does not intend to harass.'49 Even
"well-intentioned compliments"" are actionable as long as "a reason-
able victim of the same sex as the plaintiff would consider the comments
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a condition of employment and
create an abusive working environment."' The court noted that Title
VII focuses on the remedying effects of sexual harassment rather than
the motivation behind it." Moreover, the court stated that if intent be-
came a defense, it would trivialize the effects of sexual harassment on a
reasonable woman."
D. Totality of the Circumstances Test: Applications to
Non-Employee Sexual Harassment
In its 1985 Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, the EEOC provided that
the trier of fact should determine whether sexual harassment occurred
after considering the "totality of the circumstances."" This includes the
"nature of the sexual advances" as well as "the context in which the
alleged incidents occurred.""
In considering the totality of the circumstances, the courts, including
the Supreme Court in the Meritor case, have stated that evidence of a
plaintiffs speech and dress are "obviously relevant." Thus, the aver-
age reasonable woman who dresses or speaks in a certain way might
expect to be treated by men in different ways as well. Although a good
argument can be made that, like rape cases, the blame is being put on
148. Id. at 880.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 879-80. But see Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir.
1988) (stating that the harasser's conduct should be considered from the perspective
of both the harasser and the victim). See also Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines, 101 F.R.D.
549, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (stating that sexual harassment should be derived by viewing
the harasser's conduct, not the victim's perception).
154. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1993).
155. Id.
156. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
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the victim rather than the victimizer, the circumstances surrounding cer-
tain jobs cannot be realistically ignored."7 For example, a woman who
works as a cocktail waitress in a revealing costume in a workplace
which focuses on sex appeal and a woman who works in a conventional
bookstore wearing very conservative clothes should not expect the same
reactions from their customers."
As a result of the special relationship between an employee and her
clients or customers, sexual harassment by non-employees should, in
particular, be viewed in its proper context. It is arguably more important
to view non-employee sexual harassment in its context primarily because
many jobs require different kinds of attire that are aimed at creating a
certain reaction from customers but not from co-workers.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the employee's attire should
not be considered at all in the case where a female employee is sexually
harassed by a fellow worker or supervisor. This is because, as one com-
mentator argues, what is "sexually enticing" is subjective.59 Hence, a
woman may be wearing clothing that she considers conservative but that
a certain man might consider alluring. This same argument cannot be
made about many types of jobs where the employee's costume is intend-
ed to elicit a certain amount of customer attention."
157. Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in
Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1576 (1992) ("In the past, a
victim of rape had to explain her dress (miniskirts, tight pants, etc.), her behavior
(walking alone late at night), and her past sexual conduct.").
158. The woman working in a bookstore will almost certainly not be wearing gar-
ments that are meant to entertain a customer or to radiate sex appeal. On the other
hand, the costumed cocktail waitress, working in a business attempting to create an
atmosphere of sexual appeal for its customers, may very well be exposed to behavior
that would not be characterized as sexual harassment in that context but would if
she were subjected to it while working in a bookstore. Of course, the cocktail
waitress can be sexually harassed if the average reasonable woman in her situation
would find that the complained of conduct detrimentally affects the terms and condi-
tions of her employment.
159. Juliano, supra note 157, at 1576.
160. For example, cocktail waitresses do not usually have the luxury of choosing
what they wear. Because their attire is imposed by the employer, reactions to the
costume should be judged in a different context. But see EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp.,
507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. In Sage
Realty, an employer intentionally required only female employees to wear enticing
clothing, making it foreseeable that the situation would provoke sexually harassing
conduct from customers. Id. at 611. In such a situation, the employer may be violat-
ing Title VII simply by the disparate treatment he is exacting on the female employ-
ees. See id. Thus, in determining whether there is a violation of Title VII, it might be
A second argument made is that a woman may dress in a certain way
not to attract a man's attention but instead to bolster her self-esteem. 6'
Society, one commentator contends, should not "require women to dress
like nuns in order to avoid sending unknown and unintended messag-
es."" Again, certain employees, like the cocktail waitress, cannot make
this argument. The cocktail waitress is not dressing primarily for purpos-
es of self-esteem, but rather because she consents to the costume as part
of her job. Likewise, she is not sending out unintended messages. The in-
tent of dressing her in such eye-catching attire is obvious. However, if
she does not consent to her dress or the establishment is not primarily
engaged in sex appeal, her situation may be actionable under the distin-
guishable cases discussed at the beginning of this article."
Lastly, it is argued that a woman's attire should not be taken into con-
sideration because a woman may dress in a manner designed to be at-
tractive but only to a particular person."' Again, the situation is differ-
ent for the cocktail waitress. She is clearly not intentionally dressing in
an attractive manner for one person. Instead, she is dressed to be attrac-
tive as a part of the overall sexual ambience being projected. Therefore,
dress and behavior, in certain circumstances, should be considered in de-
termining whether a reasonable woman would view conduct as sexual
harassment.
E. Model Test for Judging Sexual Harassment by Non-Employees
The foregoing discussion, borrowing heavily from sexual harassment
cases in general and the Ellison case in particular, is intended to create a
model for judging sexual harassment of employees by non-employees.
The following are suggested as factors for proving such a case.
First, the conduct must be viewed from the perspective of the average
reasonable woman." This approach is not sex-biased like the average
reasonable person standard. It also controls the problem of the
hyper-sensitive plaintiff. Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the
working environment are to be considered. In cases involving sexual
harassment by non-employees, this standard is particularly effective inas-
much as victims will find themselves in numerous situations in which an
'determinative whether the attire was sexually enticing or whether the business' prima-
ry function is "sex appeal." See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
161. Juliano, supra note 157, at 1585.
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 2140 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompany-
ing note 160.
164. Juliano, supra note 157, at 1585-86.
165. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991); see also supra notes 133-53
and accompanying text (discussing the Ellison standard).
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objective standard will provide a useful gauge for judging sexual harass-
ment. For example, the average reasonable woman who works in reveal-
ing attire in an establishment that touts itself for its sex appeal would
have to consider the specific environment in determining what detrimen-
tally alters the terms and conditions of her Work environment.
Second, the conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a
condition of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment."" Under this element, one particularly offensive incident might
be enough to prove a case. However, even if the individual episodes are
not highly offensive, they may still be actionable if cumulatively they
become severe. 6 ' Again, certain kinds of conduct by non-employees
may be considered harassment in some contexts but not in others. As a
result of these differences, the severity and pervasiveness must again be
considered. Pervasive staring by a patron in a topless bar could not be
considered sexual harassment. However, such behavior by a customer in
a retail establishment could.
Third, the intent of the harasser should not be considered. If intent is
factored in, offensive behavior could be trivialized by the offender simply
by stating that he did not mean any harm and it was all just "innocent
fun."" A customer or client may think that he can have "fun" at the
victim's expense simply because the victim is working for him or is lucky
enough to have his account in a competitive business. Moreover, the
introduction of intent would foster its use as a defense by anyone ac-
cused of sexual harassment.
Fourth, the trier of fact must look at the "totality of the cir-
cumstances."" The physical context of the alleged sexual harassment is
very important in non-employee sexual harassment. The requirements of
dress and tolerated behavior of different jobs may vary greatly and cause
customers to react to employees in many ways. These differing reactions
must be considered. However, it should be emphasized that a woman's
consent to work in a "risky" workplace, such as a topless bar, does not
constitute a waiver of her legal protections under Title VIIY7 Thus, uti-
lizing the objective standards discussed above, certain acts would be sex-
ual harassment even to a topless dancer.
166. Id. at 880.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 2140 and accompanying text.
Fifth, an employer incurs liability for sexual harassment by non-em-
ployees if he knew or should have known about the conduct but fails to
take prompt remedial action."' An employee should not be required to
endure sexual harassment for an unreasonable time, taking into account
the employer's ability to become aware and control the relationship in
question.' Obviously, an employer will have difficulty gaining aware-
ness and controlling what happens to a salesperson who is rarely in the
office. Conversely, the supervisor of a cocktail waitress has the opportu-
nity to be vigilant and react quickly.
F. Remedial Action
There is no clear body of case law or any other guidelines that informs
managers when third party sexual harassment has occurred. Similarly,
there are no guidelines that specify appropriate remedial action. Howev-
er, the EEOC Guidelines discussed earlier make it clear that an employer
who knows or should have known about the harassing conduct will be
vicariously liable should he fail to react to it promptly.17
One obvious issue is discerning the perspective of a reasonable victim
in the context of employer-employee relations. As stated in Ellison, it
appears that the standard applied when non-employees are involved must
be keyed to the reasonable expectations of the employee in her particu-
lar employment environment. It should also be noted that "if sexual com-
ments or sexual advances are in fact welcomed by the recipient they, of
course, do not constitute sexual harassment."'
G. High Risk Occupations
Thus, following the Ellison principle, a court would likely conclude
that a topless female dancer would reasonably expect stares, but not
physical contact, from her audience. If she were the object of physical
contact, the employer would reasonably be expected to intervene. Clear-
ly, the failure to act would violate Ellison's reasonable woman standard.
A second issue is the immediacy of the response. In Dornhecker v.
Malibu Grand Prix Corp., ' the Fifth Circuit noted that "[slince the de-
mise of the institution of dueling, society has seldom provided instan-
taneous redress for dishonorable conduct."76 In cases of battery by a
customer upon an employee, "seldom" is the operative word. Although
171. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
172. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
174. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 n.13 (9th Cir. 1991).
175. 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987).
176. Id. at 309.
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an employer cannot "examine a charge of sexual harassment based on
one side of the story, in a vacuum, "177 in high risk situations where bat-
tery is likely, an employer's instantaneous reaction should be expected.
A third and related issue becomes vigilance by the employer. Case law
involving hostile work environment issues clearly holds that employers
are liable for what they know or should have known."8 Subjecting em-
ployees to high-risk activities demands careful and virtually continuous
supervision.
H. Mid-Level Risk Occupations
Following the reasonable woman test specified in Ellison, it could
reasonably be expected that a court would acknowledge mid-level risk
occupations. A cocktail waitress in a conventional lounge would be an
example. Some degree of sexual aggression is foreseeable where a wait-
ress serving alcohol might be attractively, but not provocatively, dressed.
Again, the question arises as to what a reasonable woman would expect.
Certainly, some attention and perhaps an occasional, but uncalled for,
compliment would not severely alter conditions of employment.
I. Low Risk Occupations
Finally, in studying a three-tier level of examples, the example of a
low-risk environment would be a female employee in a conventional
bookstore. Here, conservatively dressed in a relatively sophisticated set-
ting, little or no risk of sexual harassment is expected. The employer in
this workplace must be most protective and respond to even mild provo-
cation. The average reasonable woman would expect nothing less. In-
deed, a worker in this kind of environment should, in all probability, an-
ticipate fewer sexually hostile acts from customers than what might be
expected from a fellow employee in the workplace.
It is normal and routine and, therefore, reasonable to anticipate that
fellow employees will become well-acquainted with each other at work.
Hence, they may feel they have more freedom to probe the outer limits
of their relationships. The EEOC, in one of its policy guidelines, suggests
that sexual flirtation, innuendo and even vulgar language might not be
sexual harassment between employees. 7 This would not be true, how-
177. Id. at 310.
178. See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987).
179. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Current Issues
ever, if it were directed by a customer to our hypothetical female sales
clerk in a bookstore.
IV. POLICY FORMULATION
Given the almost infinite variety of positions occupied by men and
women in the workforce, the difficulty of formulating a sexual harass-
ment policy using the Ellison doctrine is demonstrably present. At the
same time, the'need for effective policy becomes apparent.
Case law provides no direct help, but factors emerge in analogous
cases as likely considerations. Most helpful is the classic case of Robin-
son v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., in which male employees of the
shipyard created a hostile working environment for their few female
co-workers. In doing so, a district court rejected a policy adopted by the
shipyard during pendency of the litigation.' Its reasons are instructive.
One factor the court considered was that the shipyard's policies were
adopted unilaterally without consulting or bargaining with the female em-
ployees." As noted in Ellison, "courts should consider the victims' per-
spective and not stereotyped notions." "3 It becomes apparent that the
first step in policy formulation should be employee involvement. The is-
sue thus becomes: what degree of protection do topless dancers and
bookstore clerks actually expect? Protective policy must first and fore-
most be written outside a vacuum which is littered with assumptions by
those who are just guessing about how victims wish to be treated.
The second reason the shipyard's policy was rejected related not to its
content but to the fact that it "was distributed solely through posting on
the bulletin boards in the shops.""u As a result, the court concluded
that the newly stated policy, in reality, had "little or no impact on the
sexually hostile working environment."8 ' Thus, another rule that
evolves from this case is that the policy must be generally known and in-
corporated in basic rule books, such as the affirmative action plan of an
organization."
of Sexual Harassment, N-915-050 (BNA) (March 1, 1990).
180. 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1494 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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Finally, the court cited a third reason for rejecting the company plan:
limited access to relief.17 Only one company representative was desig-
nated to hear complaints." Clearly, in the case of complaints involving
transient customers or other third parties, time is of the essence and
dispute resolution will require immediate access to some source of au-
thority. Thus, a policy must provide access to an available supervisor
while the complaining employee is on the job. Concluding that the com-
pany plan was inadequate, the court proceeded to grant the plaintiffs re-
quest for injunctive relief and forced the shipyard to adopt an "effective
and enforced sexual harassment policy.""
Quite obviously, courts will not settle for "lip service" to brush aside
problems associated with fellow employee hostile work environment
cases. There is no reason to expect less in comparable non-employee ha-
rassment cases. This is further reflected by the very detailed statement of
policy the court finally and specifically directed in Robinson. The court
noted that the policy must "describe with specificity the behaviors that
constitute harassment."" At this point, consultation with employees
would be critical. Especially in a male dominated organization which has
female employees, the reaction of a reasonable female employee under a
variety of circumstances must be open for discussion. 9' Indeed, the
Ellison case strongly stated the argument that a reasonable person stan-
dard was ineffectual because it tended to be male-biased.'92
In line with the foregoing, in a model policy, employees must be ad-
vised that sexual harassment may result from the behavior of third par-
ties. While the Robinson case specifically covered co-workers and superi-
ors, the need to transition the analysis to third party harassment is ap-
parent.
A model plan must provide "a number of avenues through which a
complaint may be initiated." This element is essential in a sexual ha-
rassment plan concerned with third party issues. Providing prompt dis-
pute resolution is critical and, in certain high-risk situations (for exam-
ple, the topless dancer), the employer must be vigilant and prepared for
an almost instantaneous response. It follows that an immediate supervi-
187. Id. at 1519.
188. Id. at 1518.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1519.
191. Id.
192. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
193. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1519.
sor must have the training to recognize offensive conduct along with the
authority to intervene and eliminate third party harassment.
Finally the employer must attempt to provide confidentiality to protect
the employee and witnesses from retaliation.94 In certain circumstanc-
es, anonymity may be impossible. Clearly, however, the employer must
be able to assure employees that they will not be adversely impacted by
asserting complaints of sexual harassment by non-employees.
The actual plan imposed on the Jacksonville Shipyards is extreme in
its detailed description of prohibited conduct, penalties and proce-
dures.95 It would be wise for employers to avoid the imposition of such
a burdensome scheme by immediately implementing a voluntary plan fol-
lowing the guides stated above, the thrust of which is an informed em-
ployer, informed employees, and avenues for prompt, effective dispute
resolution which will not directly or indirectly penalize the victim.
V. CONCLUSION
A new and complex body of law protecting employees in the
workplace is developing. These laws will impose a significant burden on
unaware employers in the form of damages and legal expenses.
An alert employer will start now by becoming aware that reasonable
employees have sensitivities. There are limits to what employees should
have to endure. Courts will cope with determining these limits and will
almost certainly be compelled to struggle with a moral issue when inter-
preting the message in an employee's appearance.
Courts will recognize that women may not entirely voluntarily place
themselves in what are termed "high-risk" vocations. Their choices may
well have been limited by social or economic conditions. As in the.past,
it is reasonable to believe that courts will treat these women's plight
with understanding. Although distinctions may be made between dancers
and clerks by following the previously discussed adaption of the Ellison
approach, vast differences are not anticipated or advocated.
In addition, complex issues remain to be addressed. A change in the
nature of employment is an example. The conventional cocktail lounge
that unexpectedly initiates a "Chains Nite" policy, which would subject
the staff to a new clientele, may certainly expose its employees to an
atmosphere that was never initially expected.
An alert employer should take action once he becomes aware of
changing law, employee expectations, and the complexity of issues. One
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1541-45.
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company plans to deal with third party harassment by authorizing
self-help. A memorandum was issued after the chief executive learned
that, during a party, his saleswomen were offended by "wandering, and
probably inebriated hands" of male clients. It read, "In the future, I
would urge you to make your feelings known to such people immedi-
ately. If that doesn't work, a good whack-client or not-would make us
all feel better.""
For reasons best left to a discussion of tort liability and respondeat
superior, this scheme is not recommended. The proposal, which advo-
cates an informed employer and employee, and avenues for efficient
dispute resolution which do not penalize the victim, is suggested as a
more reasonable means of accomplishing the policy goals of protecting
employees from sexual harassment by non-employees.
196. Winokur, supra note 5, at B8.

